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On May 18, 2012 leaders of the G8 and three African countries jointly launched the New Alliance 
for Food Security and Nutrition (NA). The collaboration was announced by the US president at the 
time, Barack Obama, who declared that “…food security is a moral imperative, but it’s also an 
economic imperative. History teaches us that one of the most effective ways to pull people and 
entire nations out of poverty is to invest in their agriculture” (Obama, 2012). NA aims to do just 
that: enhance Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in African agriculture by a partnership model 
committing public and private actors to shared goals of “sustained, inclusive, agriculture-led 
growth” (New Alliance, n.d.A).  
However, this aim – and with it NA as such – has received severe media criticism for being but a 
thin foil for what the The Guardian has dubbed the ‘corporate scramble for Africa’ (Jones, 2014): 
“It will be like colonialism. Farmers will not be able to farm until they import, linking farmers to 
[the] vulnerability of international prices. Big companies will benefit” a Tanzanian politician told 
the newspaper (Kabwe, quoted in Provost, Ford & Tran, 2014). More recently, the European 
Parliament (EP) has issued a resolution raising similar concerns, albeit in different tones. Thus, the 
EP (2016) in its review of NA:   
Calls on governments and donors to suspend or review all policies, projects and 
consultancy arrangements that directly encourage and facilitate land grabbing by 
supporting highly harmful projects and investments or indirectly increase pressure on 
land and natural resources and can result in serious human rights violations. 
Here, the general unease with a perceived neocolonial drift within NA is coupled with a specific 
worry about land grabbing; that is, large-scale acquisition of farmland so as to concentrate 
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ownership or user rights on a few actors, often large multinational companies (Cotula et al., 2009: 
3).  
In this paper, we aim to explore the possible link between NA and neocolonialism, generally, as 
well as land grabbing, more specifically, asking whether the laudable principles and practices of 
NA, despite declared intentions, may have adverse effects. Put succinctly, our query is whether NA 
offers an innovative form of multilateral cooperation that may pull more people out of poverty more 
effectively than public investment alone or precipitates a restrictive form of corporate colonialism 
that involves dependence on big business rather than increased self-sufficiency. While this question 
may seem polemical, it is not rhetorical; as briefly indicated above there is a real debate as to 
whether the pro-growth principles of NA translate into positive development practices. That is, is 
the NA’s partnership model equally advantageous for everyone involved?  
To answer this question, we will first present a conceptual framework that builds on established 
critiques of development initiatives and points to possibly better principles and practices. Here, we 
begin by observing a commonality between organization studies (OS) and development studies 
(DS), which have both raised concerns about a neocolonial drift in currently dominant forms of 
development policies and practices. Theoretically, then, we draw upon common insights of OS and 
DS in order to establish a framework for studying the local consequences of multinational 
development initiatives; that is, for conducting the empirical investigation of a possible corporate 
scramble for Africa. On the basis, we will discuss what is needed in an agenda of reinvigorating the 
principles of global value chains by means of practices of alternative organizing, thereby combining 
and applying more specific insights of the DS and OS literatures, respectively. Our framework, 
then, consists of two tiers: one general and common to OS and DS and aimed at diagnosing the risk 
of a neocolonial drift in the principles and practices of NA; the second more particular and 
combining the DS concept of global value chains with OS insights on alternative organizing, aiming 
to suggest an agenda for identifying new and better avenues for development.  
We apply the framework in a multi-level, mixed-method analysis of New Alliance. Here, we first 
conduct a macro-level analysis of key documents related to the initiative in order to identify its 
dominant development principles and organizational logics. Second, we engage in a meso-level 
investigation of how these general principles and logics have been politically implemented in the 
case of Malawi, one of the now total of ten African countries to have joined the alliance. Third, we 
delve further into the micro-level details of our chosen case country in order to assess the practical 
implications and real-life consequences for rural communities involved in and/or affected by NA 
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initiatives. Based on this analysis, we finally engage in the discussion of not only how to understand 
and assess NA, but also of possible improvements of current practices.  
 
Organization meets development: A common critique 
While development policies and initiatives are, obviously, at the core of development studies, they 
have only been an occasional concern for organizational scholars. Further, organization studies’ 
engagement with development has quite singularly been in line with – if not directly inspired by – a 
certain strand within development studies; namely, that which is critical of the principles and 
practices that arguably dominate (or have dominated) the empirical field of development. 
This strand of DS begins from the observation of continued inequality between the participants in 
relationships of development, often formerly colonized and colonizing countries (Frank, 1969; 
Wallerstein, 1986; Edwards, 1989). By the mid-1990’s this observation had become so pervasive 
and was perceived to be so problematic as to constitute a scholarly as well as practical ‘impasse’ of 
the field of DS. Most notably, major development organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank had, since the 1970s and ‘80s, been heavily criticized for operating on 
universalized caricatures of development that were unsuitable in practice (Long & van der Ploeg, 
1994). This failure of dominant development logics, led to calls for alternatives:  
In much current development work, the advice we put forward cannot be used locally 
because it is manufactured under completely different circumstances. The only way to 
ensure its relevance is by fostering the participation of poor people in identifying their 
own problems, priorities and solutions” (Edwards, 1989: 127; see also Booth, 1994).  
Thus, the rising suspicion of the ‘development project’ (Sharp & Briggs, 2006) led to a new agenda, 
which may broadly be described as postcolonial in the sense that its adherents are particularly 
concerned with the pervasiveness of asymmetrical power relations between historically colonized 
and colonizing peoples (Schurmann, 1993). Beginning from this concern, a number of different 
positions and approaches have emerged, ranging from complete deconstruction of development in 
the ‘anti-development’ perspective to more constructive takes of empowerment and participation, 
good governance and livelihoods (Booth, 1994). Further, the enhanced attention to what might be 
termed ‘the postcolonial condition’ of DS has led to a ‘cultural turn’, which recognizes the 
heterogeneity of the subjects of development, facilitating a “re-learning to see and reassess the 
reality of the global South” (Simon, 2006: 13) and focusing on the ‘sub-altern’ people who are 
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scripted out of conventional histories and narratives (Chambers, 1997). Moreover, postcolonial DS 
emphasizes the ‘situated local’ (Simon, 2016), and the adverse effects that development initiatives 
may have on this subject. Such concepts as ‘development from below’, ‘putting the last first’, and 
anti-development/post-development (Chambers, 1997; Escobar, 1995) aim at ameliorating this 
situation by tapping into and empowering “localized cultural politics that inflect translocal 
discourses of development, a sort of contra flow to globalizing discourses” (Moore, 2000: 655). In 
sum, the challenge posed by postcolonial DS “…is to link […] local identities, practices and 
agendas to broader and multiscale campaigns and ‘projects’ for progressive and radical change that 
are substantially postcolonial and critically (post)developmental” (Simon, 2006: 17).  
While not exactly subject to a ‘postcolonial turn’, OS has been alerted to “the hegemony of western 
management thinking” (Muhr & Salem, 2013: 66) and sought to ‘decolonize’ its own discourses 
and practices (Jaya, 2001). More specifically, postcolonially inspired OS aims to ‘provincialize’ 
what was previously taken to be universal knowledge and seeks to reconfigure the field of research 
so as to become more receptive to “deconstructive, emancipatory and relational theorizing” 
(Westwood & Jack, 2007). Further, postcolonial insights typically inform analyses and critiques of 
the organization and management of development policies and initiatives, whereby OS engagement 
with the field of development is generally aligned with the postcolonial strand of DS. In this 
context, the work of Bobby Banerjee and his co-authors stands out as providing particularly 
succinct critiques of the pervasive asymmetry of donor-recipient relations (see inter alia Banerjee, 
2000; Banerjee & Linstead, 2004; Banerjee & Jackson, 2017). Importantly, Banerjee has pointed 
out the uneasiness of the ‘post’ in postcolonialism; we must not let it become an excuse for 
absolving “…any claims for present consequences of the damages caused by colonization” (2003: 
146), but instead see it as an entryway into “…new spaces for critique and resistance” (ibid: 164). 
Thus, Banerjee’s particular brand of postcolonialism does not dissolve, let alone absolve, the 
asymmetrical power relations between former colonizers and colonies, but to the contrary seeks to 
expose and criticize the pervasive colonialism of broad discursive constructions like ‘sustainable 
development’ (Banerjee, 2003) as well as specific initiatives like ‘microfinance’ (Banerjee & 
Jackson, 2016).  
OS and DS, then, share a general critique of ‘mainstream development policy’, which is seen to 
“...perpetuate colonialist and western-centered discourse and power relations, even as it seeks to 
focus attention on the marginalized” (Sharp & Briggs, 2006: 7). More specifically, a neocolonial 
relationship is discerned in matters of land ownership that means the sovereignty of so-called 
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developing countries and indigenous communities continues to be impaired by the interventions of 
a nexus of international organizations and multinational corporations (Banerjee, 2011; Carmody, 
2016; see also Banerjee, 2000). In adopting the shared postcolonial framework of OS and DS, we 
are not diverted from studies of power relations, but rather alerted to the potential pervasiveness of 
colonialism at the level of discourse as well as practice. That is, using this framework enables us to 
explore whether and how NA might be neocolonial in both the ideological sense of imposing 
Western ideas and policies on non-Western contexts and the material sense of actual Western take-
overs of non-Western land.  
 
From common critique to common alternatives? 
The similarities between postcolonial perspectives within OS and DS are, as established above, 
apparent: First, and more generally, a critical concern with the power relations inherent in 
universalizing discourses and standardized practices; there is never a ‘one size fits all’, and we 
should be weary of anyone who tells us so. Second, and more particularly, a critique of the way in 
which development initiatives tend to transfer the dominant logics of western politics to the global 
South, leading to detrimental effects. Here, we see the contours of the argument that current 
development initiatives constitute a neocolonial ‘scramble’: such initiatives are said to be not only 
indirectly complicit in, but actively supportive of multinational corporations’ take-overs of land and 
other natural resources in the developing world, generally, and Africa, more particularly (Moyo, 
Yeros & Jha, 2012; Carmody, 2016). The common starting point, then, is that development 
initiatives are perceived to have a neocolonial drive; they demand of the recipients of such 
initiatives to not only reshape themselves in the image of the donors (whether individual countries 
or international organizations), but also – and as a result of this reshaping – to make themselves 
vulnerable to takeovers by multinational corporations. 
Beginning from this critique, both OS and DS turn to ‘the local’, hoping to find there not only 
resistance to dominant development policies, but also alternative practices that may substitute or at 
least supplement these. Within DS, one prominent result of this search for more localized and 
nuanced alternatives has been the identification and promotion of ways in which local producers 
may be integrated into and gain stronger positions within so-called global value chains. Global 
value chain analysis focuses on the current global restructuring of production into dispersed and 
expanding networks of actors that integrate producers in the global South with buyers in the global 
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North (Gereffi, 1994; Gibbon & Ponte, 2005). Here, “economic activity is not only international in 
scope; it is also global in its organization” (Gereffi, 1994: 96). Focusing on the integration and 
position of different actors in global production and trade, global value chain analysis also looks 
into governance structures and the distribution of power within the chains (Barrientos, 2005; 
Gereffi et al, 2005) as well as actors’ possibilities for ‘upgrading’, i.e. improving their position in a 
global value chain, which links directly to development. In order to upgrade, it is necessary for 
producers to be integrated into the global value chains and to move up the value-added ladder into 
more profitable positions in the chain (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2004). In other words, focusing on 
economic upgrading, integration into a global value chain is a precondition for upgrading and 
generates possibilities for development (UNCTAD, 2013). Recently, social upgrading has been 
included in the global value chain approach, meaning the position of small holders and 
marginalized groups in global value chains has attracted attention from development organizations 
and scholars. One example is the Capturing the Gains project that highlighted the difficulties in 
distributing the gains of linking up to global values chains and the role of multi-facetted and 
strategic policy approaches in promoting inclusive growth and poverty reduction (Goger et al., 
2014). Meanwhile, there is an emerging argument that inclusion into global value chains may lead 
to economic upgrading, but simultaneously to social downgrading of marginalized actors (Gereffi, 
2014). Hence, globalization without measures for redistribution and bottom-up initiatives may link 
globalization directly to increased inequality (Kaplinsky, 2000). 
While DS scholars have focused on how to create more equal relations between donors and 
recipients by empowering local producers within global value chains, OS literature tends to attend 
more specifically to finding and advancing local alternatives. In fact, an entire sub-field of 
alternative organization studies, dedicated to this endeavor, is emerging. Here, alternative 
organizations are identified through their compliance with the minimal qualifying criteria of 
enhancing individual freedom, collective solidarity, and general sustainability (Parker et al., 2014). 
And the hope is that studying organizations that fulfill these criteria may enable OS to not only 
engage with organizations more constructively, but also to partake in generally positive social 
transformations (Parker & Parker, 2017). In the present paper, we follow a similar logic of not only 
criticizing the powers that be, but also looking for better alternatives. Thereby, we hope to be able 
to identify local practices that may, if given sufficient support, come to reconfigure global value 
chains. Thus, we begin by studying NA at the policy level, then move into a more detailed analysis 
of its local implementation, noting not only the consequences of, but also the possible alternatives 
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to it. Before proceeding to this analysis, however, we will present the methodological 
considerations and procedures that support it.  
 
Methodology: Operationalizing the critique of development 
In order to investigate the general postcolonial argument concerning the neocolonial drive of 
currently dominant development principles and practices, we need to, first, establish whether or not 
current development initiatives can, indeed, be characterized as neocolonial. Further, even if we can 
confirm a neocolonial tendency or threat, we cannot immediately conclude that development 
initiatives are inherently bad. Such a conclusion would itself suffer from the universalizing 
tendencies that the postcolonial approach sets out to dispel. Instead, we must carefully assess the 
specific consequences of particular initiatives as these are realized in certain contexts. That is, we 
must not only look at general development discourses and principles, but also study how they are 
articulated and practiced ‘on the ground’, as it were. These reflections lead us to abandon any 
ambition of being able to speak of development initiatives as a totality and, instead, turn to the 
study of one more particular initiative and the specifics of its realization.  
As mentioned in the introduction, we focus our empirical work on the NA and its implementation in 
Malawi, as one particularly relevant example of the principles and logics of current development 
work and how these play out in practice. In the following, we will first provide the background for 
this case selection, then detail the methods of our data collection and, finally, present the analytical 
operationalization of our theoretical framework. 
 
Case selection: New Alliance and its implementation in Malawi 
The issue of food security has been particularly dominant in development discourses since the 
global food price crisis of 2007-2008 and the subsequent global economic crisis (Food Security 
Information Network, 2017). These crises resulted in historically high levels of worldwide hunger, 
both in proportional and absolute terms. With the aim of attending to the, at the time, 1 billion 
people facing hunger, the G8 countries promised substantial funding for global food security at the 
2009 Summit in L’Aquila, Italy. In order to fulfil this promise, the G8 leaders launched NA in 2012 
as a joint public and private commitment to sustained agricultural growth in Africa (White, 2013). 
NA, then, is an important and ambitious initiative aimed at addressing one of the most commonly 
recognized and pressing challenges of development work.  
7 
 
This provides the general backdrop for our choice of case, but we are also more specifically 
motivated by the critique that has been raised against NA. As mentioned in the introduction, both 
perpetrators of public debate (e.g. The Guardian) and institutionalized political actors (e.g. the EP) 
have raised concerns about the neocolonial tendencies of NA. Further, the claim that NA propagates 
Western ideology has been forwarded in policy papers (e.g. McKeon, 2014) and supported by 
research articles (e.g. Brooks, 2016).  While we do not take this critique at face value, it does make 
NA a particularly relevant choice for our investigation; here, we are likely to find the tendencies of 
which our theoretical framework speaks and to be able to study their consequences in the richest 
possible empirical detail.  
However, the study of how development principles are turned into practices must be further 
localized as we cannot assume that NA will have the same consequences in all contexts. Again, we 
have relied on existing critique to identify Malawi as one context in which NA has already been 
accused of having adverse consequences (Patel et al., 2014). Further, and as will be detailed in the 
following section, we had unique access to the Malawian case, making it an ideal site for the 
detailed examination of how NA played out in one particular context.  
 
Data collection 
Our case study involves two initial units of analysis: the general principles and logics of NA and the specific 
practices of their implementation in Malawi. These two levels are connected by the so-called Country 
Cooperation Framework (CCF) that specifies how NA is to operate in Malawi. In order to cover the general 
and the local level as well as the interconnections between the two, we collected a wide range of qualitative 
data, consisting primarily of documents and interviews. Documents were used for the analysis of the general 
principles and logics of NA as well as the implementation of these in Malawi. Here, we gathered all relevant 
texts from publically available sources (for an overview, see table 1).  
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 For the analysis of local practices and experiences, however, we needed more specific and 
specifically located material. Here, we relied on previous (and previously unpublished) research 
performed by one of the authors who in 2016 conducted an extensive study of land deals in Malawi. 
A total of ten government officials, 13 civil society stakeholders and 50 smallholder farmers were 
interviewed (for an overview, see table 2). 
While the research in Malawi focused on one particular aspect rather than the full range of 
consequences of NA, namely land grabbing, this issue has been pointed out as a particularly direct 
and detrimental manifestation of neo-colonialism. Zooming in on this specific issue provides a 
strong starting point for not only criticizing NA, but also identifying possible local practices that 
may provide better alternatives to currently dominant principles and practices. 
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 Analytical operationalization 
As mentioned, our theoretical framework alerts us to the potential neocolonialism of development 
initiatives in both the ideological sense of imposing Western ideas and policies on non-Western 
contexts and the material sense of actual Western take-overs of land and other (natural) resources. 
However contested the concept may be, it seems safe to assume that neoliberalism remains the 
currently dominant Western ideology (Gamble, 2001; Mirowski, 2013; Springer, Birch & 
McLeavy, 2016). Therefore, we begin the assessment of the potential ideological neocolonialism of 
NA by establishing whether and in what way NA can be said to rely on neoliberal principles and 
logics.  
Rather than engaging in discussion and/or critique of neoliberalism per se, this part of the analysis 
is primarily descriptive, focused on identifying commonly recognized indicators of neoliberalism 
(e.g. privatization, open trade, deregulation; see figure 1 for details) in NA documents, generally, 
and in relation to Malawi, specifically. Thus, we use the assessment of the degree to which NA 
espouses neoliberal principles and demands that participating recipient countries must enact 
neoliberal policy reforms as a proxy for its propensity to ideological neocolonialism.  
Material neocolonialism is, in principle, easier to trace: to what degree have Western actors taken 
over non-Western land as a result of NA? In practice, however, data on this matter is often hard to 
find and causal relationships even harder to establish. Nevertheless, we will provide as neutral an 
account of this aspect as possible, relying on the data on provided by the Land Matrix, “a global and 
independent land monitoring initiative” (LandMatrix.org, 2017).  
On the basis of the identification of ideological and material neocolonialism – or neocolonial drives 
– in NA, we turn to the more interpretative task of detailing how these drives are experienced in the 
local context of Malawi. In the final discussion, we will provide our assessment of the current 
situation and turn to the discussion of how it may be improved. 
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 Figure 1: Indicators of neoliberal principles and policies (based on DePhillips, 2015) 
 
Ideological neocolonialism 
In order to identify the ideological underpinnings of NA, a series of specific issues must be 
addressed, and this initial part of the analysis concerns two of these. First, the section presents the 
overall content, underlying assumptions, and origins of NA (macro perspective). Secondly, we look 
into how NA has been implemented in Malawi, focusing on the new role of the private sector as 
compared to the role of the national governments (meso perspective).  
New Alliance is a child of the G8 2012 Summit, and hence predominantly designed by the G8 
countries. It is a reaction to previous failed development initiatives and brings the private corporate 
sector more directly into development initiatives. NA was presented by former US President Obama 
at the 2012 summit where he called on a number of stakeholders, including companies, to lift the 
burden of securing global food security, because, as he said, “[…] government cannot and should 
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not do this alone. This has to be all hands on deck” (Obama, 2012). The fundamental principles of 
NA, including donor pledges, pro-market reforms and corporate capital investments, are primarily a 
developed nation invention. However, the partnership platform Grow Africa, established in 2011, 
was an additional driving force in the development of NA. This platform was founded jointly by the 
African Union (AU), The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the World 
Economic Forum (McKeon, 2014). Beyond the indirect influence of AU, it is unclear to what 
degree African nation states and leaders have had the opportunity to form or alter the design and 
implementation of NA at the overall level. It is likewise unknown whether the leaderships of any of 
the ten involved African nations have had the desire to do so.  
What is clear, is that in both NA and Grow Africa there is no smallholder-farmer representation. 
Neither smallholder-representing organizations nor local civil society organizations working with 
nutrition and poverty have been involved in the process of developing the NA framework. Further, 
when NA is implemented at the national level through CCFs, the negotiation of each of these 
frameworks is undertaken exclusively in collaboration between donor countries, governments, and 
private sector firms. No other domestic stakeholders, e.g. smallholder farmer organizations, have 
been involved in the negotiations in any of the ten countries (McKeon, 2014). This is despite the 
stated policy that: “New Alliance Cooperation Frameworks are developed in consultation with 
farmer organisations to ensure policy reforms and investments respond to the specific needs and 
opportunities of small-scale farmers.” (DFID statement, 2013). This lack of consultation from 
smallholder farmer organizations in the procedures of designing the NA framework and in the 
signing of agreements with local governments has been pointed out by the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter among others (ACF, 2014).  
In order to ensure accountability in NA, an international Leadership Council has been put in place 
as an “informal, multistakeholder leadership group committed to advancing progress on investment 
in sustainable and inclusive agricultural development in Africa […]” (New Alliance, 2014). As 
stated in its Terms of Reference, this forum is taking the role of monitoring, supporting and 
advancing progress of commitment implementations. The goal of the Leadership Council is also to 
“align the work of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa partnership 
in support of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)” (Co-
Convenors of the Leadership Council, 2014). The Council is formed by African governments and 
agencies, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Secretariat, multilateral 
organizations, such as International Finance Corporation (IFC); civil society organizations, such as 
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Oxfam America; private sector firms, such as Yara; and development donor partners such as the 
European Union. The exact scope of the Council’s mandate holds a degree of uncertainty, however. 
The Terms of Reference state that the Council provides: “strategic direction and advise. It does not 
provide operational governance of or oversight to either the New Alliance or Grow Africa, each of 
which have or will develop their own coordination, governance and accountability structures” (New 
Alliance, 2014). Thus, the actual governing body and the governing practices ensuring 
accountability of the New Alliance are not transparent.  
The development model of NA assumes that growth and development are interlinked and facilitated 
by the private sector: 
Africa is on the rise. Under the leadership of President Obama, we have pioneered a 
new model of development that is transforming agriculture and accelerating Africa’s 
impressive growth and potential. By harnessing the skills, resources and expertise of the 
private sector, we can build on our investments to power the markets of the future and 
lift millions of people out of extreme poverty (USAID administrator Rajiv Shah, as 
quoted in Ford, 2014).  
Donald Kaberuka, president of the African Development Bank, is also optimistic about NA:  
Anything that ensures that we become part of the global value chain is welcome. 
Anything that enables us to develop agribusiness is what we need, in short investment. 
The New Alliance is meant to achieve the following, ensure that the policies are in 
place which encourage agricultural production, that the infrastructure is in place and 
then businesses encouraged to come … as they do in mining as they do in 
telecommunications and in financial services (as quoted in Tran, Provost & Ford, 2014). 
Inherent to the reasoning of the New Alliance framework is the assumption that increased food 
security and decreased poverty levels across the ten participating African nations is predicated upon 
sustained and inclusive growth in their agricultural sectors. The means to achieve such growth 
appear to be found primarily in promoting investment. As stated on the website of the White House, 
“[…] our goals are to increase responsible domestic and foreign private investments in African 
agriculture, take innovations that can enhance agricultural productivity to scale, and reduce the risk 
borne by vulnerable economies and communities” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2012).  
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Moving from the NA, generally, to the Malawian context, more specifically, former president Joyce 
Banda echoed the pro-growth and pro-privatization sentiments in her justification for the decision to 
join NA in 2013:  
My government doesn't just view agriculture as an essential means to attaining 
household and national food security; we see it as a business through which our farmers 
can generate wealth, improve their livelihoods and transform Malawi's economy. None 
of this can be achieved without private-sector investment (Banda, 2013).  
The specific contents of the NA-Malawi deal are presented in Malawi’s CCF. It was initiated 
by the Malawian government in 2012, launched in 2014 and revised in 2015 into the final 
draft, reducing the number of policy commitments from an original 35 to a total of 15. The 
specific contents of the agreement are categorized within three pillars; namely, 1) 
commitments made by donor countries, 2) policy commitments made by the Malawian 
government, and 3) investment intentions announced by private sector actors, both 
international and Malawi-based.  
In the first pillar, eight donor countries and the European Union have announced their commitments 
to support various funds and programmes working locally and nationally in Malawi under the NA. 
Malawi’s CCF sums up the donation commitments to be a total of $273.9 million in 26 different 
projects during a 6 year-period. It is not stated whether these commitments, or parts thereof, 
constitute fresh funding or are part of established donation regimes between the donors and Malawi.  
As the second pillar, the Malawian government has committed to undertake 15 policy reforms 
categorized under four main objectives: Firstly, to create a conducive environment with reduced 
risk in doing business and fair market returns for farmers, including: elimination of export bans and 
promotion of exports, promoting smallholder integration into agricultural value chains through, for 
instance, contract farming, tax reform to promote increased investments, identification of land for 
commercial agriculture, and a review of seed policy and the regulatory framework for fertilizers in 
order to encourage competition. Secondly, to improve access to water and basic infrastructure 
focusing on two policy commitments, namely ensuring that irrigation infrastructure accommodates 
food and priority cash crops, and secondly prioritizing rural feeder roads1, which lead to primary 
production areas of prioritized food and cash crops. Thirdly, improve productivity, storage of 
1 Feeder roads are “unpaved rural roads that link agricultural productivity areas with either district roads or national 
roads” (World Bank, 2011). 
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produce and produce packing. Here, two policy commitments are to introduce agricultural zoning2 
based on prioritized food and cash crops, and to “reorganize extension services to improve delivery 
of modernised market-oriented agricultural extension services” (CCF, 2015, p. 5). Finally, to 
improve advocacy for the growing and consumption of more nutritious food crops and agro-
processed foods in order to reduce the prevalence of stunted growth. 
In the third pillar of the NA deal, concrete investment plans have been announced by private sector 
firms. So far, 26 companies have signed letters of intent, briefly describing their intentions of 
agricultural investments. The private sector investment to be channeled to Malawi through NA 
comes from 10 multinational companies, one cotton development initiative3 and 15 African-based 
firms. Foreign companies have pledged to invest more than $112 million in Malawi’s agricultural 
sector. Malawi-based companies have pledged approximately $60 million. The companies commit 
to invest in land and processing facilities. The prioritized crops among investors are groundnuts, oil 
seed commodities, dairy products, maize, fruits, seeds, toor dahl, sugar, honey and tobacco. There is 
no systematic reporting on which commodities are meant for the Malawian market and which are 
meant for exports. However, it can be expected that products such as tobacco, sugar and fruits are 
directed to the international market since global values chains for these specific commodities are 
already in place.  
Although the general rhetoric surrounding NA does not directly refer to deregulation, privatization, 
and limiting of subsidies, looking at the policy commitments in Malawi’s CCF, some formulations 
do link directly to the neo-liberal trajectory of development studies. In Table 3 below is a 
comparison of the main neoliberal market-oriented policy strategies and Malawi’s NA policy 
commitments that potentially align with these through: emphasizing measures of job creation and 
trickle down growth, lack of involvement of local knowledge, no involvement of food expertise, 
key indicators based on doing business index and increased dollar value. There are no indicators for 
progress in food security.  
 
2 “The purpose of agricultural zoning is to protect farmland from incompatible uses that would adversely affect the 
long-term economic viability of the area within the region” (Kruft, 2001).  
3 Competitive African Cotton Initiative (COMPACI) has been funded by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), while Africa-based private cotton 
companies are responsible for implementation on site (Compaci, 2017). 
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Neoliberal strategy 
NA policy 
commitment 
no. 
NA Policy commitment by Malawian government 
Privatization 14 
Reorganise extension services to improve delivery of 
modernised market-oriented agricultural extension services 
[MoAIWD] 
Tax reform 6 Review taxation regime and its implementation to promote more investment 
Financialization 5 
Fast track implementation of financial sector development 
strategy by improving Export Development Fund 
effectiveness and developing low cost finance opportunities 
Cutting labor costs 4 Develop strategy and legislation for contract farming 
Greater international 
trade 
2 Review Control of Goods Act to eliminate export bans and improve licensing e.g. duration 
3 
Promote effective smallholder participation in agricultural 
value chains by formulating a special Farmer Organisation 
Development strategy  
9 Review seed policy, strategy and certification to enhance regional harmonisation 
10 Develop farm input regulatory framework for fertiliser to encourage competition and regional harmonisation. 
Deregulation   
General facilitation of 
investment 
7 Identify land, in phases, suitable for commercial agriculture (10,000 ha/year from 2013) 
11 
Ensure that irrigation infrastructure designs accommodate 
food and priority cash crops (with designs up to the farm 
gate and water storage) 
13 Introduction of agricultural zoning based on priority food and cash crops in growth clusters 
 
Table 3: Indicators of neoliberalism in Malawi’s NA policy commitments 
It is unknown whether investors have been chosen on the basis of increased production within 
specific sectors or whether all investors have been accepted to NA regardless of their type of crop 
production. Thus, there is no requirement for investors to produce food crops rather than cash crops, 
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for instance. Among 26 letters of intent from investors, only a few are committing to the following 
development related activities: Four investors intend to provide training for smallholders, three to 
engage in demonstration/research farm/training centers, three in finance solutions, two will engage 
in a partnership with the farmers’ union, one in an ecotourism project, and one will engage with 
developing cooperatives. Hence, a total of 14 activities can be said to lie beyond a traditional sphere 
of business activities, and potentially enhance progress in food security. Furthermore, judging from 
the letters of intent, no companies are involved, directly or indirectly, in any of the 26 food security 
projects funded by the NA donors. Meanwhile, all 26 investing entities have described their 
intentions to develop, contribute to, and support different elements of the Malawian agriculture, by 
for instance creating employment, building research farms or adding value to certain agricultural 
sectors. The common denominator of all these commitments is increased investments and mobilized 
capital. Thus, not all investors are committing to job creation or training of smallholders, which 
indicates that there is no requirement to provide these benefits. 
The companies are given certain gains in return for joining the NA: Elimination of export bans, pro-
market regulatory environment for doing business, improved infrastructure, agricultural zoning – 
provisions of large tracks of land, beneficiary tax regime, tax laws to make it easier for companies 
to do business in the country, enhanced brand recognition and publicity. Whereas the gains for 
smallholders are more diffuse, difficult to measure, and indirect, such as: potentially getting wage 
jobs instead of independent farming, possibility for contract farming, possibility for training, 
possibility for access to loans, and possibility for access to improved seeds. 
As reported in Malawi’s NA progress reports of 2014 and 2015, the implementation in Malawi has 
so far been a success. The report of 2015 writes out the progress in such indicators as: Improved 
score on Doing Business Index; increased dollar value of private sector investment in the 
agriculture sector and value added agro-processing; increased private investment in commercial 
production, sale of inputs and produce and value addition. Besides an updated estimate for each of 
these indicators, the progress report reviews the stages of the fulfillment of donor, government and 
investor commitments. However, there is no mention of the progress made with regards to food 
security and poverty levels as an effect from the implementation of the NA and no measurements or 
indicators documenting the impact on hunger, malnutrition and access to food in the country. 
Summing up this first part of the analysis, we find that investment-based growth assumptions, 
trickle-down logics, and other neoliberal ideas pervade general NA documents, just as a strong 
impetus to implement neoliberal policies of, for instance, privatization, tax-reduction and free-trade 
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saturates specific NA agreements, as exemplified by the policy commitments written into Malawi’s 
CCF. This clearly indicates that Western ideas are imposed upon non-Western contexts as a 
prerequisite for participation in NA; that is, a drive towards ideological neocolonialism is inherent 
to this initiative. However, the NA is not necessarily experienced as neocolonial in its 
implementation and practice in the local context. Rather, this issue is yet to be explored, but before 
doing so we turn to the issue of whether NA potentially facilitates material as well as ideological 
neocolonialism.   
 
Material neocolonialism   
As powerful as ideas may be, it may seem harsh to talk of a neocolonial drive simply because a 
development initiative is based upon and/or propagates Western ideas. While many postcolonial 
critiques do just that, we seek to extend our analysis from the ideational to the material level in 
order to assess whether and to what extent NA facilitates actual Western take-overs of non-Western 
land. As mentioned in the theory section, the grabbing of land and other (natural) resources has far 
from gone unnoticed in the critical literature, and one may even speak of a new scramble for Africa, 
but how does NA relate to this scramble?  
As it turns out, this is the point on which NA has been criticized most harshly; it is said to promote 
land grabbing by MNCs rather than to support and empower smallholders to climb up the global 
value chains in which they are involved. This argument has been advanced most vehemently by 
various NGO’s and advocacy groups (see inter alia Curtis, 2015; Haigh, 2014; Pascal, Jorand & 
Jamart, 2014), but it has, as referenced in the introduction of the paper, also been taken up by 
political institutions like the EP (European Parliament, 2016). And it has, as we will detail in the 
discussion section of this paper, gained some academic traction, albeit in somewhat modified form.  
The main support for the argument is that NA offers private investors easy access to land that was 
formerly public property or owned by smallholders by explicitly including this issue in the 
participating countries’ CCFs. In the case of Malawi, 200,000 hectares of land were initially to be 
made available for large-scale commercial farming, and even though this area was reduced to 
10,000 hectares per year in the final CCF, the number may still be seen as a clear indicator that NA 
facilitates corporate takeover of local resources. We could, in principle, observe the material 
neocolonialism of NA by documenting which companies have actually bought how much land and 
what it is being used for, but such documentation is not readily available. That is, there are no 
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official records of the land deals made as part of NA. Instead, we may get an initial idea by looking 
at which companies participate in the CCF and what their crops are, as already listed in the previous 
section. This list provides evidence of “…the kind of agriculture envisioned by the New Alliance: 
large scale, export driven, chemically intensive, centralized knowledge and expertise in the (mainly 
foreign) private sector” (Patel et al. 2014). Whether and how the participating companies have 
realized this vision, generally speaking, and in terms of the acquisition of land, more specifically, is, 
however, more difficult to ascertain. Land Matrix reports eight land deals in Malawi, but only two 
of these took place after the country had entered NA. Further, the site’s data, by its own reckoning, 
is only 50% complete. The two confirmed deals to have taken place in or after 2013 amount to a 
total of only 952 hectares, but with a reported intention to expand one of the deals with a further 
3000 hectares. In both deals, the primary investors are private companies and in both cases they are 
backed by the UK and other Western governments. Further, the purpose of both deals is commercial 
agriculture, and contract farming is involved in both cases. In the present context one of the two 
lead companies, Malawi Mangoes, is especially interesting as we will hear more about it in the next 
analytical section. 
For now, the available evidence only allows us to draw a few conclusions. First, we can see that 
Malawi is acting in accordance with the underlying assumptions behind NA, that attracting 
agricultural investments, “[…] will help smallholder farmers (most of them women farmers in 
Africa) to improve their agricultural production and increase their incomes” (Feed the Future, 
2012). Thus, the NA logic of land deals is that investing firms will increase incomes through local 
job creation, and particularly through contract farming. Contract farming, or outgrower schemes, is 
a way in which agribusinesses can include or hire smallholder farmers to produce certain crops, but 
on their own plots of land. The smallholders obtain access to necessary inputs to increase 
productivity and can sell the produce to the company after harvest. In essence, it is understood to 
promote food security through employment and increased productivity; preferably, through the 
technology and innovations provided by the private sector. Second, a critical lens would turn the 
story around and conclude that, even though the evidence is still scarce, there are concrete examples 
that the ideological neocolonialism of NA is materialized in and through land deals, which not only 
grant MNCs access to, but also control over land that was formerly locally owned and cultivated. 
The question, then, is how the material consequences of NA ideology is experienced in practice. 
Are they felt to be oppressive and exploitative or, perhaps, empowering and profitable? That is, is 
NA neocolonial in its experienced practices as well as in its principles and policies?  
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 Experienced neocolonialism 
 
Having established the ideological and material impetus towards neocolonialism inherent to NA 
principles and policies, it becomes pertinent to study how these are practiced and, especially, 
experienced. Here, the real-life implications for rural smallholder farmers is especially relevant. 
How do they experience the implementation of NA policies? Thus, we turn to evidence from rural 
community members, civil society stakeholders as well as government officials in Malawi in order 
to analyze the implications that the political focus on agricultural commercialization brings about. 
In order to address this issue as thoroughly as possible, this final analytical round is structured 
around proving the following claims: First, commercial agriculture is politically prioritized in 
Malawi, and the government is committed to identifying land and facilitating its acquisition for the 
sake of investment. Second, such political focus risks dislocating and/or excluding smallholder 
farmers. Third, dislocation and/or exclusion impairs the livelihoods and food security of 
smallholder farmers.  
First, the general development strategy of the Malawian government with its focus on industrial 
farming is particularly apparent in interviews with government officials and civil society 
organizations. When asked about the development potentials of commercializing agriculture, Mr. 
Simbani, Director of Development at the Ministry for Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development says: “We are just starting. Everybody saying that’s the way to go.” Likewise, when 
asked the same question, the Chief Executive of the Malawi Confederation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (MCCCI), Mr. Kaferapanjira states: “Yes, that’s the way to go. And the 
question is where are you going to get the land. People from rural areas, make sure that they get 
jobs elsewhere. To me it’s the best way for them to become factory workers, some laborers or 
something. You have to find an alternative occupation for the people. You can’t commercialize 
agriculture without moving the people. You have to find an alternative… In my view, it is better to 
get people out of the land. Because it works for them in the long run. Make sure you have 
commercial farms there and people have other options.” When asked whether the Malawian 
government shares this view, and urges the commercialization of agriculture, he says: “They do. But 
they think the policies might be unpopular, because sometimes they displace some people.”  
The Director of Crop Development at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development, Mr. Ching’oma, explains the advocacy for commercial farming thus: “If we bring a 
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new company to invest on a 5000ha piece of land, we give them land, and then they employ 3000 
people, already that's tax for the government. And with that tax, the government can build a 
hospital in the same location. They can build a road in the same location. In terms of social 
services, it's not necessar[ily] income coming to the pockets of the communities, but you might find 
that important services might be improved in the area. Those are indicators of economic growth. In 
the long term the community benefits.” According to Mr. Chinsinga, Professor of Political Science 
and Deputy Director at the University of Malawi, another explanation for the government’s 
advocacy for industrializing agriculture lies in the necessity of earning foreign exchange. He says 
[…] one of the ways is to promote large-scale farming and initiatives like the New Alliance [are 
therefore] attractive to the government.”  
Second, land expropriation is not an entirely new phenomenon in Malawi. Often labeled as ‘land 
grabbing’, the process entails the dislocation of smallholder farmers in usually rural communities 
from their land as it has been acquired by an agricultural investor (Chinsinga et. al., 2013, 
Chasukwa, 2015). This is made possible by the government’s commitment to facilitating land 
acquisitions and the lack of safeguard mechanisms ensuring proper compensation and negotiations 
with small-scale farmers. Thus, smallholders are potentially left without means of survival, let alone 
the opportunity and ability to buy up new farmland. 
Interviews with small-scale farmers in Malawi demonstrates this tendency. Six community 
members in the village of Kazilira in the Dwangwa district gave individual testimonies of having 
unwillingly lost their land to a sugar producer, Dwangwa Cane Growers Trust. The land lost by the 
six smallholders was farmland, on which they grew crops for the survival of their families. As 
explained by one respondent, around 500 people in her community were affected by this land 
takeover, including people not only losing farmland, but also land on which they had built their 
homes. Another respondent explained how he has been “[…] cultivating ever since my father gave 
that land to [me], it has been a source of [my] livelihood, [I have] been growing food for [my] 
family and maybe selling some surplus for [my] own development. [T]he land was grabbed from 
[me] […] through the police, which used coercive means to take the land and also use the authority 
that they have.” The remaining respondents likewise described how the police forced them away 
from their land on the day of the take-over: I […] just heard from other people who say that no, if 
you go to Kazilira this time, you are going to see tractors and many things are happening there, 
tractors destroying houses and many people are crying. When I wake up I go there, and I find 
police are all over there. They were not allowing someone to go there. I was beaten somehow 
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because I said I can go there to find out what, and they say ‘no, you cannot go there, this is not your 
land, this is our land’. So it was just matter of forcing. 
Two community interviews testify of similar events. In Kasitu village in the district of Nkhotakota, 
community members had formed a food security group with the purpose of protecting their land 
from Dwangwa Cane Growers Trust. Of the 20 people interviewed, five people had lost their land 
to sugar production. They describe how “[t]hey did not consult us, and we just saw that our land 
was gone” and how they “[…] were in their fields […] and then suddenly police came with guns 
and they had to run for their lives. And that is how it was taken. Just like that”. When asked 
whether they received compensation for their land the response was: “Not any compensation. 
Everyone in this area, no one has received compensation.” 
In the Salima district, villagers explain how their land was leased by the British fruit company, 
Malawi Mangoes; a company partnering in NA and on record for entering land deals after Malawi 
had entered the alliance (see above). While the community members did not directly inhabit the 
land, they expressed their despair as they were forced to sell the livestock, which had been grazing 
on the land prior to the lease. Hence, land displacements of smallholder farmers occur in Malawi, 
and although we cannot, with the available data, link existing displacements to NA, we have strong 
indications that they will remain a tool in the implementation of commercial agriculture as a 
political priority.  
Third, smallholder communities were questioned about the effect that the loss of land has had on 
their livelihoods, and all unanimously described a negative impact. The main issue appears to be the 
shift from being a self-sufficient producer of food to being dependent on others for work. As one 
respondent stated: “In terms of survival, [I am] struggling because [I do not] have a place where 
[I] can continue cultivating what [I] want. So [I] survive on casual labour, pieces of work 
elsewhere, and then [I] get maybe 1000 MWK and buy something from others, maybe maize.” 
Another community member explained how she depended on her land not only for food, but also 
for selling produce to be able to finance her children’s clothes and education. She stated that this is 
no longer possible. Furthermore, none of the interviewed community members had been offered a 
job from the company investing on the land previously belonging to them.  
The testaments of the smallholders are supported by key civil society stakeholders. When asked 
how the livelihood of smallholder farmers would be affected by losing their land, Audrey Namwaza 
from the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi (NASFAM) responded: “If it is 
taken away, their means of survival will not be there, because they produce to survive. They are 
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producing for their own consumption. And it is very little that is sold. The impact would be adverse. 
For sure, their livelihood would be affected.” Mr. Dzanja from Lilongwe University of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources likewise assessed the effects of land deals to be adverse for the smallholders: 
if they don’t even have their land to produce food, of course that is going to affect their food 
security and eventually their economic livelihood is going to be affected negatively as well.” Mr. 
Chinsinga, from the University of Malawi also pointed to the shift from being a self-sustained 
farmer to being a peasant working at others’ farms: “What they have now on offer is only their 
labour. That kind of livelihood is not sustainable. You cannot survive on working on other people's 
land, because what you get is very low.”  
Thus, it appears clear that the expropriation of smallholders from their farmland significantly 
impedes their livelihood. The development mechanisms that are operative within NA have led to 
dislocation of communities in Malawi and effectively decreased their food security. This is acutely 
troublesome as it is in direct opposition to the stated goals of NA. The principles and policies of 
NA, then, may be said to lead to the opposite of what they are said to do. The logic of NA is, quite 
simply, wrong and this, in our view, exposes the neocolonial drive as not only inherent to NA, but 
also a direct outcome of its implementation.    
 
Concluding discussion 
The operative logics of the NA in Malawi, focusing on job creation, facilitation of FDI and trade, 
tax reform, and privatization, bear strong similarities to a neoliberal ideology. This demonstrates a 
general assumption that an increase in private investment will contribute to development and food 
security through trickle-down dynamics. The favoritism and inclusion of private investors in 
Malawi has shown to generate practices of expropriations of smallholder farmers with little or no 
opportunities of resistance. The occurrence of expropriations means that the implementation of the 
NA in Malawi is experienced negatively by smallholders. Besides losing their land, they have 
incurred losses of self-determination and self-sustainability as well as the right to resistance. In 
other words, when looking at the practical consequences on livelihoods in Malawi, the ideological 
and material neocolonialism of NA also result in neocolonial practices that are experienced as 
oppressive and conducive of destitute. As this is in direct opposition to the stated goals of NA, this 
paper demonstrates that the logic of this initiative is inherently flawed; it subjects the supposed 
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beneficiaries of NA action to a new form of corporate colonialism in which MNCs strip 
smallholders of their livelihoods and/or tether local farmers to their modes of production. 
 
Our ambition is not only to criticize these tendencies, but also to look for and agenda of more viable 
alternatives. Thus, we turn back to DS and OS literature for indications of what might be done. 
Where DS has found global alternatives in the form of attempts to reposition developing countries 
within the value chains of which they form part, OS has turned to local practices. Thus, a new 
approach to alternative organizing is currently emerging around specific studies of local sites that 
have organized themselves in ways that may be said to ‘prefigure’ (Maeckelbergh, 2011) broader 
societal re-organizing, e.g. in the form of participatory democracy (Reedy, King & Coupland, 
2016), co-operative ownership (Webb & Cheney, 2014) or translocal resistance (Banerjee, 2011). 
From this perspective, currently disadvantaged individuals and groups improve their situation, not 
by gaining a better position within an already established value chain, but by reconfiguring the very 
relationships of which they form part. Although global value chains has been applied to 
international development initiatives with a strong focus on economic upgrading through inclusion 
into a global chain, bringing in social aspects to upgrading and new measures of value into the 
application of value chains in development is still lacking. Linking concepts of economic and social 
upgrading to alternative organization is relevant in this case – given that the aim of NA results in 
the exact opposite: social downgrading of small holders. The logics of NA and neo-liberalism/neo-
colonialism are based on economic upgrading, but do not take social upgrading into account 
although the aims relate to this. Thus, there still is a need to turn current logics on their head, 
beginning with the local smallholders and considering what can be done to empower them in 
relation to global value chains; they need to move up these chains as independent actors, not 
through MNCs. 
In order to redirect the distribution of upgrading and value, and integrate small holders into global 
value chains, a new agenda for inclusive development from below needs to establish ways to 
integrate actors from below by engaging in the local before the global. While there might be 
positive outcomes of foreign investments, governance and commitment is needed at all levels, e.g. 
by having requirements beyond investment project, bring in more inclusive pro-poor measurements 
for success, diversification, poverty reduction measurements.  
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